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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 16-4242 
__________ 
 
MEGAN EXEL; DAVID EXEL; JOSEPH RADCLIFFE;  
E.V., Minor; A.R., Minor 
 
v. 
 
NICHOLE GOVAN, conducting business as a state government employee;  
DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES (DYFS), Department of Children  
and Families; JANAY TAYLOR; COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND; JOHN DOES of 
DYFS, City of Bridgeton, State of New Jersey and Cumberland County; 
ALLISON BLAKE, Commissioner New Jersey DYFS 
 
       Megan Exel, David Exel and Joseph Radcliffe,  
                        Appellants 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court Civil No. 1-12-cv-04280) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 September 12, 2017 
 
BEFORE:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed January 9, 2018) 
__________ 
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OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 After learning that appellants Megan Exel and Joseph Radcliffe violated a Safety 
Protection Plan, Janay Taylor and Nicole Govan, who work for the Division of Youth and 
Family Services, removed A.R. (the biological child of Megan and Joseph) and E.V. (the 
biological child of Megan).  Megan, Joseph, and David Exel1 appeal the District Court’s 
decision to grant Govan qualified immunity against their Section 1983 claims.  They also 
contend that the District Court erred by denying them an opportunity to amend the 
complaint.2  We will affirm.3 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The Safety Protection Plan designated David Exel, the childrens’ grandfather, with 
temporary custody of the children. 
 
2 We have de novo review over a district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
Carpenters Health v. Management Resource Systems Inc., 837 F.3d 378, 382 (3d Cir. 
2016).  We give de novo review to the grant of summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity.  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).  We generally 
review for abuse of discretion assertions of error relating to amending the complaint.  In 
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
3 On June 18, 2013, the District Court dismissed all claims against the Division of Youth 
and Family Services, and the claims against Allison Blake, Nicole Govan, and Janay 
Taylor in their official capacities.  The case against the City of Bridgeton terminated on 
July 30, 2013.  On January 23, 2014, the District Court dismissed all claims against the 
County of Cumberland and all claims brought on behalf of the minor plaintiffs without 
prejudice.   
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 Appellants point to precedent requiring “reasonable and articulable evidence” to 
support the removal of a child from a parent’s home and argue that Govan violated their 
constitutional rights by failing to provide this.  Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & 
Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997).  But their reliance on Croft as 
controlling authority here is not persuasive.   
 We have previously concluded that the reference in Croft to reasonable and 
articulable evidence “is too broad for purposes of qualified immunity.”  Mammaro v. 
New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) 
as amended (Mar. 21, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 161 (2016).  Moreover, the 
caseworker in Croft removed a child from the custody of the parents based only on 
hearsay allegations of abuse.  Croft, 103 F.3d at 1126; see also Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 
170.  The undisputed record here is distinguishable, clearly indicating that a Safety 
Protection Plan was operative when Govan removed the children and that she acted 
because the parents violated the Plan.  For these reasons, the District Court correctly 
decided that, for purposes of qualified immunity, no clearly established law existed to put 
a reasonable official on notice that she or he could offend the Constitution by temporarily 
removing children from their parents after finding the parents to be in violation of a 
Safety Protection Plan.   
 Appellants also dispute the facts that prompted Govan to judge them to be in 
violation of the Plan.  But, for the reasons we just explained, we conclude that the District 
Court properly based its decision to grant qualified immunity to Govan on the absence of 
clearly established law. 
4 
 
 Appellants next contend that, when Govan implemented the Plan, she violated 
procedural due process.  Even assuming, arguendo, that procedural due process rights 
were operative here, the District Court did not err.  It properly held that clearly 
established law did not exist to put a reasonable official on notice that she or he would be 
infringing parents’ due process rights by not discussing with them the consequences of 
violating the Plan, their right to an attorney, or their right to a hearing.  Appellants’ 
argument, which relies on a district court decision that assesses due process requirements 
in this context (filed two years after the conduct at issue here), is wholly inadequate to 
establish notice for the purposes of our analysis.4 
 Finally, Appellants claim the District Court abused its discretion by not allowing 
them to amend their complaint.  However, the District Court never denied such a request.  
Moreover, Appellants do not claim they lacked the opportunity to amend.  Rather 
Appellants position is best framed as asserting error because the District Court refrained 
from sua sponte directing them to amend their complaint.  They contend the District 
Court should have advised them to amend their official capacity claims to include a 
request for injunctive relief.  Appellants also complain that the District Court did not 
instruct them to amend their complaint to add an individual capacity claim against Janay 
Taylor.  Courts can give pro se parties broad leeway to present their case, but the 
                                              
4 Appellants do not contest the District Court’s ruling that Govan is entitled to absolute 
immunity for Appellants’ various assertions that Govan misled them or mishandled 
aspects of the case beyond the removal.  Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of Chester 
County, 108 F.3d 486, 488-89 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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neutrality of the court is paramount regardless of the status of the parties.  Therefore, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it did not guide Appellants to amend their 
official capacity claims or add an individual capacity claim. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
